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RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES-NEGLIGENCE-STRICT LIABILITY AGAINST THE
SLEEPING DRIVER-In a guest-host action, the plaintiff
sued to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in
an automobile accident which occurred because the defendant
driver had fallen asleep. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
in a unanimous decision overruling all prior cases,' held
that falling asleep at the wheel is negligence as a matter
of law, and no facts can exist which will excuse such neg-
ligence. Once it is proven that the driver went to sleep,
the defendant has the burden of showing that the driver's
loss of consciousness was not due to that cause. Theisen
v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 91, 118 N.W.2d
140 (1962).
Acts done while one is asleep are involuntary and in
and of themselves do not constitute negligence.2  The basis,
however, for the liability of the driver is his negligence in
falling asleep.3 Since it is within the driver's control to
either stay awake or cease driving, he has the duty to stay
awake if he continues to drive. 4  This rule seems to be
based upon the courts' recognition that the approach of sleep
is usually indicated by certain premonitory symptoms. One
does not fall asleep without warning and may be negligent
in not heeding the indications of sleep's approach or the
circumstances which may bring it about. 5
The application of the basic concept that a sleeping driv-
er is liable differs in various jurisdictions. A majority of states
1. See, e.g., Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis. 24-9. 248 N.W. 155 (1933);
Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 263 Wis.
633, 58 N.W.2d 424 (1953). The fact the driver of an automobile goes to
sleep while driving is a proper basis for an inference of negligence suf-
ficient to make a prima facie case and support a verdict for recovery if
no circumstances tending to excuse such conduct are proven.
2. Stanley v. Burnside, 20 Misc. 2d 932, 192 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1959); State
v. Olsen. 108 Utah 377, 160 P.2d 427, 429 (1945).
3. Whiddon v. Malone, 220 Ala. 220, 124 So. 516, 518 (1929); Bushnell v.
Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432, 434 (1925); Devlin v. Morse, 254
Mich. 113. 235 N.W. 812, 813 (1931); Steele v. Lackey, 107 Vt. 192. 177 Atl.
309, 311 (1935).
4. Whiddon v. Malone, 220 Ala. 220, 124 So. 516, 519 (1929); Diamond
State Tel. Co. v. Hunter. 41 Del. 336, 21 A.2d 286 (1941); Stanley v. Burn-
side, 20 Misc. 2d 932, 192 N.Y.S.2d 452, 455 (1959).
5. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432, 435 (1925); Dia-
mond State Tel. Co. v. Hunter, 41 Del. 336, 21 A.2d 286, 288 (1941); Berno-
sky v. Greff, 350 Pa. 59, 38 A.2d 35, 36 (1944).
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hold that falling asleep while driving is a proper basis for
an inference of negligence. As such it is sufficient to make
a prima facie case and support a verdict for recovery.6 It
is, however, possible for the defendant to rebut this presump-
tion.7  If he attempts to do so, he creates an issue of fact
regarding due care. The question then becomes one of
credibility for a jury properly charged that sleep does not
come without warning."
Defendants often argue that a driver goes to sleep unknow-
ingly from physical exhaustion, which is a sudden unfore-
seen physical disability over which the driver has no control.
However, the courts have consistently refused to consider
such a defense.9
In a few cases it has been held that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur was applicable to the sleeping driver. 10
Also he has been held grossly negligent 1  and guilty of
reckless and wanton misconduct 2 under the various rules.
In this writer's opinion, the better rule is that falling
asleep at the wheel is negligence as a matter of law. Any
6. See, e.g., Cooper v. Kellogg, 2 Cal. 2d 504, 42 P.2d 59 (1935); Bush-
nell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925): Richie v. Chears, 288
S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1956); Gower v. Strain. 16) Mis. 344. 145 So. 244 (1933):
Savard v. Randall, 103 N.H. 234. 169 A.2d 276. 278 (1961): Baird v. Baird.
223 N.C. 730, 28 S.E.2d 225 (1943); Bernosky v. Greff, 350 Pa. 59, 38 A.2d
35, 36 (1944); State v. Olsen. 108 Utah 377, 160 P.2d 427, 428 (1945): Jones
v. Pasco. 179 Va. 7, 18 S.E.2d 258 (1942).
7. Diamond State Tel. Co. v. Hunter, 41 Del. 336, 21 A.2d 286, 288 (1941).
If the driver can establish that he had a normally sufficient amount of rest:
that he was mentally alert and physically fit immediately prior to falling
.asleep; that he had not been driving for such a period as to indice fa-
tigue; that no warning drowsiness preceded the accident: and that he
had not taken any alcoholic liquors or drugs, he successfully rebuts the
presumption of negligence.
8. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432, 435 (1925); Kaplan
v. Kaplan, 213 Iowa 646, 239 N.W. 682, 685 (1931); Stanley v. Burnside, 20
Misc. 2d 932. 192 N.Y.S.2d 452, 455 (1959).
9. See Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925); Kaplan
v. Kaplan, 213 Iowa 646, 239 N.W. 682, 685 (1931); Devlin v. Morse, 254
Mich. 113, 235 N.W. 812, 813 (1931); Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins.
Co., 18 Wis. 2d 91. 118 N.W.2d 140 (1962). The courts hold that sleep is
usually attended by premonitory warnings, and going to sleep at the
wheel Is negligence in failing to heed the warning. Therefore, the driver
does have control, as he can cease driving. If while driving a car one is in
such a state of exhaustion that he falls asleep without any premonitory
warning, he is chargeable with the knowledge of any ordinarily prudent
man that such exhaustion is reasonably likely to cause sleep, and he
should cease driving.
10. Thompson v. Kost. 298 Ky. 32, 181 S.W7.2d 445 (1944); Levy v. In.-
demnity Ins. Co., 8 So. 2d 774 (La. 1942); Collins v. McClure, 143 Ohio St.
569, 56 N.E.2d 171 (1944); Gendron v. Gendron, 144 Me. 347, 69 A.2d 668
(1949). There is an inference that the accident was due to the negligence
of the one having Possession and control of the automobile which caused
the injury where, in the absence of an explanation, such seems to be the
only fair and reasonable conclusion.
11. Blood v. Adams. 269 Mass. 480, 169 N.E. 412 (1929); Steele v. Lackey,
107 Vt. 192, 177 Atl. 309 (1935).
12. Kuharskl v. Somers Motor Lines, 132 Conn. 269. 43 A.2d 777 (1945):
Marks v. Marks, 308 Ill. App. 276, 31 N.E.2d 399 (1941).
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driver who does so transforms his automobile into a danger-
ous undirected mechanism. Realistically no circumstances
or excuses should justify such conduct when one considers
the duty of care imposed upon every driver. When one is
under a duty to use care not to injure another, he cannot
fulfill that duty by falling asleep. The above stated rule acts
as a much greater deterent force and allows the aggrieved
parties a sounder remedy.' 3 Therefore such conduct should
not be excusable.
Although there is no North Dakota case law exactly
in point, it is submitted that the courts of this state should
follow the view expressed in the instant case.
WILLIAM JAY JOHNSON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-RIGHT To COUNSEL
-Petitioner was charged in a Flordia state court with
having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit
a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law.
The court denied petitioner's request for a court-appointed
counsel. Being without funds he was forced to conduct his
own defense. He was found guilty and sentenced to five
years in the state prison. On the grounds that the court's
refusal to appoint him counsel denied him constitutional
rights, the petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Florida Supreme Court. All relief was denied. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the judgment
was reversed and the cause remanded to the Supreme Court
of Florida. Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
At common law a person charged with treason or a
felony had no right to counsel; in fact, counsel was not
allowed for such crimes. Strange as it may seem, counsel
was allowed, indeed, even required in most misdemeanor
cases.' In this country twelve of the original thirteen colon-
ies guaranteed the right to counsel either in their constitu-
13. Once the plaintiff has proven that the driver fell asleep, the driver
cannot excuse or justify his conduct.
1. I STEPHAN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
341 (1883): I ARCHBOLD'S CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PLEADING 54(8th ed. 1880).
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